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ABSTRACT 
This research replicates with modifications t·he previous 
study by Coombes, otto and Stokes (1993) which examines 
the economic determinants of the amortisation of 
identifiable intangible assets (liAs). The study focuses 
on the published consolidated annual reports of a sample 
of top 150 listed Australian companies, ranked by market 
capitalisation, as at June 1989, over the period '1989 to 
1990, whereas the previous study by Coombes et al. (1993) 
concentrates on the top 150 listed Australian companies,· 
ranked by market capitalisation, as at 30 June, 1988, over 
the period 1986 to 1989. 
The empirical evidence of the present research using 
contracting theory suggests that management's choice of 
amortising liAs depends on whether the investment of these 
assets has a 'raluable growth option to generate cash flows 
into the companies. The evidence does not support the 
practice of liAs' amortisation in order to reduce covenant 
limitations under existing debt contracts and future debt 
raisings, and to cause minimisation of political 
vulnerability. Support for the profit-based mangerial 
compensation incentives to amortise liAs appears only in 
1989, possibly due to the pending ED49 "Accounting for 
Identifiable Intangible Assets" issued by the Australian 
Accounting Research Foundation which required systematic 
,.,,. 
'. ! 
amortiaal:ion of liAs. 
.i 
These findings a<e cons\stent with 
thoae of Coombes et al. (1993). 
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CHAPTER 1 
III'I'RODUCTIOII 
1.1 Statement of the Problem 
In Australia and overseas countries, there has been a 
long-standing controversial discussion of accounting 
practice in relation to amortisation of Identifiable 
Intangible Assets (IIAs) (see Coombes, Otto & Stokes, 
1993; English, 1990; Ferris & Hall, 1989; Kohler, 1989; 
Lawson, 1989; Reilly, 1989; Walk~r. 1992), 
1 
According to Australian Accounting Reaearch Foundation 
(AARP) (AARF, 199,, p.5), Identifiable Intangible Assets 
are those "~on-monetary assets without physical substance, 
which are capable of being both individually identified 
and specifically brought to account, and include but are 
not restricted to brand names, copyrights, franchises, 
intellectual property, licences, ma~theads, patents and 
trademarks''; purchased gocdwill is excluded because it is 
an unidentified remainder excess of the purchase 
consideration in a business acquisition. 
The accounting practice of recording IIAs in the annual 
reports has increased since the introduction of Accountinq 
Standards Review Board (ASRB) Approved Accounting Standard 
ASRB 1013 ~Accounting for Oooclwill" in April 1988 (ASRB, 
2 
1988), which has statutory backing. It requires the 
purchased goodwill to be systematically amortised over a 
maximum period of 20 years. Instead of complying with 
this statutory requirement, many companies have started to 
recognise such liAs as trademarks and broadcasting 
licences to reduce, in part or entir~ly, the impact of the 
requirement for the amortisation of purchased goodwill 
(Coombes et al., 1993; Wines & Ferguson, 1993). 
In August 1989, AARF attempted to develop an accounting 
standard on liAs by issuing an exposure draft, ED49 
"Accountinc;J for ldentifiable Intangible Assets" (AARP, 
1988) which required IIAs to be amortised by systematic 
charges to the profit and loss account over the period 
during which benefits are expected to occur. ED49 
"Accounting for Identi~iable Intanqible Assets., did not 
specify an upptn limit to the period of time over which an 
asset may be amortised, but, required detailed disclosures 
to be made when the amortisation period exceeded 20 years 
(AARF, 1989, p.14-15). Nevertheless, due to extensive 
opposition reflected by 118 submissions to AARF (Coombes 
et al., 1993, p.28-29) and "the present lack of consensus 
on the suhjtect at a national and international level" 
(AARF, 1992, p.1), Australian Accounting Standards Board 
(AASB) r.nd Public Sector Accounting Stanclards Board 
(PSASB) withdrew 1!:049 "Accounting for Identifiable 
Intanv1ible Assets" in March 1992. To date, there are no 
Auotralian accounting regulations or standards in relation 
to liAs, beside Corp~raticns Law (Australian Corporations 
& Securities, 1993, section 294 (4)) and Accounting 
3 
Standard AASB 1010 11Accounting for the Revaluation of Non-
current Assets" (AASB, 1993) requiring the directors to 
revalue the assets at their replacement cost or their 
recoverable amounts at the end of the finan~ial year, 
Australian companies managers can choose the accounting 
treatment of the amortisati~n of liAs that they wish to 
apply (Coombes eta!., 1993, p.3-4). 
1.2 · Purpose of the Research 
The aim of this research project is to replicate with 
modifications the study done by Coombes et al. (1993) by 
investigating the diverse accounting practices, for the 
amortisation of IIAs as evident in the published 
consolidated annual reports of a sample of top 150 
Australian Stock Exchange listed companies over the period 
1989 to 1990. The present research also examines if there 
are any changes in the liAs' amortisat~.on accounting 
policy choice as a result of voluntary compliance before 
or after the introduction of I!D49 "Accounting for 
Identifiable Intangible Assets" which occurred in Au11ust 
1989. 
The present research seeks to re-test the hypotheses 
examined by Coombes et al. (1993) in which contractin!l 
theory is used to explain the motivation for management's 
choice among the accounting methods for amortising liAs. 
This research focuses on whether the growth option nature 
of the I I As of the company, the effects of II As' 1 egal 
lives, profit-based managerial compensation incentives, 
company's indebtedness of existing debt contracts, 
company's ability to raise future debt in debt markets or 
political vulnerability costs, will affect management's 
choice of the amortisation method of liAs in order to 
increase or decrease reported profit. The findings are 
then compared with the previous research done by Coombes 
et al. (1993) and other previous studies (Carnegie & 
Kallio, 1988; Goodwin & Harris, 1991; Wines ~ Ferguson, 
1993). 
1.3 Organisation of the Research 
Chapter 2 summarises previous research and develops the 
research hypotheses to be examined in the study. Chapter 
3 presents the research method used 11nd variable 
me:tsurement and data collection methods. Chapter 4 
presents test results, and provide!'J a discussion of the 
results as well as econometric prc•blems involved in the 
present study. Pinally, Chapter 5 provides the summary 
and conclusions, limitations anc!. implications of the 
research. 
4 
CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW, THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Literature Review 
This section reviews both descriptive and empirical 
studies related to accounting policies of IIAs adopted by 
the listed Australian companies. 
5 
Carnegie & Kallio (1988) examine the annual reports of the 
100 largest listed Australian companies, ranked by market 
capitalisation, in the financial year 1987. They examine 
the accounting policies adopted for intangible assets 
other than goodwill and consider the impact of Accounting 
Guidance Release 5 (AGRS) "Accounting for Intangible 
Assets Recognised in Accordance with Statement of 
Accounting Standards AAS 18 'Accounting for Goodwill'". 
The findings show that non-compliance with the guidance 
release is continuing, with 35.4% of the sample companies 
adopting the practice of zero amortisation for IIAs. One 
half of the sample companies which were not amortising 
IIAs provided the reason that amortisation was not 
necessary because these assets did not diminish in value. 
Goodwin & Harris (1991) examine the annual reports of a 
sample of top 90 listed Australian companies (excluding 
trust and funds, and mining companies) in the period 1987 
6 
to 1989, ranked by market c&pitalisation, in order to 
identify the accounting policy changes resulting from 
compliance with both the Australian Accounting Standard 
AAS 18 "Accounting for Goodwill" and ASRB 1013 "Accounting 
for Goodwill". The findings show that, by 1989, only a 
few companies in the sample were not complying with the 
requirements of AAS 18 "Accounting for Goodwill" and 
ASRB 1013 "Accounting for Goodwi 11". However there is an 
increase in the number of companies who record liAs and do 
not amortise either in full or in part. One-third of the 
companies recording liAs revalued at either directors' 
valuation or an independent valuation, rather than 
recording liAs amortised at cost. The findings suggest 
that the management's accounting choices for goodwill and 
liAs in most of Australia's largest companies seem to be 
influenced by the goodwill accounting standard ASRB 1013 
"Accounting for Goodwi 11". 
Wines & Ferguson (1993) examine a sample of 150 Australian 
Stock Exchange listed companies in the period 1985 to 1989 
in order to examine the accounting policies adopted for 
goodwi 11 and for II As. The findings show that, over the 
study period, non-compliance with goodwill accounting 
standards AAS 18 "Accounting for Goodwill" and ASRB 1013 
"Accounting for Goodwi 11 11 is decreasing, but the practice 
of companies recording liAs and electing not to amortise 
liAs io increasing. As a result, this supports the 
argument that companies have been recognising liAs to 
;,, 
reduce the influence of the requirement of accounting 
standards for goodwill amortisation on reported operating 
profits, 
7 
In summary, the findings of the above studies sug;est that 
the compliance with the relevant goodwill accounting 
standard to amortise goodwill systematically over a period 
not exceeding 20 years (ASRB, 1988, ASRB 1013, clause .35) 
may cause the companies shift to non-compliance with AGRS 
"Accounting for Intangible Assets Recognised in Accordance 
with Statement of Accounting Standards AAS 18 •Accounting 
for Goodwi 11• ". In other words, the companies have 
started to re-classify goodwill as liAs and have adopted 
the practice of zero amortisation for some or all of the 
liAs. 
It appears that the only empirical study which is using 
contracting theory is Coombes et al. (1993). They select 
a sample of top 150 Australian Stock Exchange listed 
companies, ranked by market capitalisationr as at 30 June, 
1988, over the period 1986 to 1989. They examine the 
IIAs' amortisation accounting policy choices and the 
corporate lobbying submissions made in 1989 on ED49 
"Accountin; for Identifiable Intangible Assets". The 
findin;~ support the liAs' ;rowth option hypothesis and 
the effects of liAs' le;al lives hypothesis, that is, the 
incentives to amortise IIAs depend upon the payoffs under 
claimholder contracts in the firms in order to indicate 
8 
the cash flows to be derived from the IIAs. Support of 
the findings for the profit-based management compensation 
incentives to amortise liAs only occurs in 1989 when the 
AARP introduced ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable 
Intangible Assets". In addition, the findings reveal that 
the debt covenants hypotheses for existing debt and future 
debt raisings, and the political visibility costs 
hypothesis receive little or no support. 
From the literature reviewed, with the exception of 
Coombes et. al. ( 1993), the use of contracting theory to 
demonstrate some explanation for the amortisation of liAs 
seem& to be extremely thin. It is the purpose of this 
research to employ contracting theory to examine the 
reasons why comi'anies adopt particular liAs 1 amortisation 
policy. Contracting theory will be discussed in the 
following section. 
2.2 Contracting Theory 
Accounting researchers have been concentrated on 
developinq a positive accountinq theory to explain and 
predict the economic factors that determine management's 
choices of accountin9 procedures and methods. There are 
two stages in the development of positive accounting 
theory. The first is the information perspective which 
investigates the relationship between the announcement of 
accounting earnings and the reaction of share prices, and 
suggests that accounting methods are chosen to reveal the 
manager's expectations about the future cash flows of the 
firm. The second is the contracting perspective which 
involves contracting costs in firms and in the political 
process, and focuses on either the ex post research 
(opportunistic behaviour) or the ex ante research 
(efficient contractinq) (Houltausen, 1990; Watts, 1992; 
Watts & Zimmerman, 1990). 
9 
The ex post research concentrates on the "specification of 
an accounting policy choice as a part of the bonding and 
monitoring process to reduce the costs of contracting", 
whereas the ex ante research concentr~tes on the 
rationalisation of an accounting policy choice for 
opportunistic behaviour by managers to transfer wealth 
away from other claimholders on the firm to managers in 
order to maximise their own utility (Hodgson, lioi..-,-,es & 
Kam, 1992, p.388). 
Jensen & Mecklinq (1976) examine the contractual 
relationship between m•na9ers and shareholders and between 
mana9ers-shareholders and debtholders. To them, the firm 
is defined as a "nexus of contracts", which in turn will 
give rise an "a9ency relationship" between the supr.!_iers 
of va~ious production factars, such as debt, equity and 
human capital (Whittred & Zimmer, 1990, p.7). The aqency 
relationship described by Jensen & Mecklinq (1976, p.308) 
10 
is "a contract under which one or more person (the 
principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some services on their behalf which involves delegating 
some decision making authority to the agent". 
However, this agency relationship causes the problem of 
ayency costs. Jensen & Meckling (1976, p.308) have 
identified a list of agency costs which include monitoring 
ex9enditures by the principal, bonding expenditures by the 
agent and a residual loss. These agency costs which often 
arise in "contractual scenarios" have led to the use of 
the term "contracting costs" instead of agency costs 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1990, p.134). 
The contracts (debt covenants, management compensation 
plan, contracts arise in political process, and other 
contracts, such as sales contracts) between the suppliers 
of production factors are often written around accounting 
numbers. Contracting theory suggests that the contracts 
between the contracting parties via accounting numbers as 
ex ante mechanisms to minimise the contracting costs and 
hence maximise the value of the company (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990). However, on one hand, the accounting 
numbers are used to enforce the legal and property rights 
between the contracting parties; on the other hand, 
manipulation in the measurement of these accounting 
numbers as the result of ex post opportunistic managerial 
1 
I 
I 
I 
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behaviour can effectively redistribute the wealth between 
the »arties. (Whittred & Zinrner, 1990, p.7) 
As a result, contracting theory is often used to explain 
and predict the management's incentives to choose a 
particular accounting procedure and method. The 
management incentives examined in this research relate to 
the growth option nature of IIAs, the effects of legal 
provisions qoverniuq the utilisation of I lAs, the debt 
contract incentives .and the political costs. Therefore, 
the hypotheses d•~eloped in this study are based on these 
management incentives and will be discussed in the 
following section. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
Since this research is a replication of the study done by 
Coombes et al. (1993), all the development of hypotheses 
in the present research is based on the same theoretical 
framework used in the previous study, with some exceptions 
made in this study. 
First, the period 1989-.~990 was selected for the present 
research, to consider if there are any changes in the 
liAs' amortisatfr.m accounting policy cboicf' before and 
subsequent to the issue of ED49 "Accounting for 
Identifiable Intangible Assets". The previous study 
" ', 
' : ; 
i 
I 
l 
l 
1 
l 
selected the period 1986-1989 which is before the Au9ust 
1989 release of the ED49 "Accountin9 for Identifiable 
IntlS.n;ible Assets", in order to avoid the effect of 
exposure draft. 
Next, the dependent variable used in the previous study, 
AMORT, concentrates only on the amortisation expenses, 
whereas the present study uses AMORT to focus on all the 
write-offs of riAs including am~rtisation expenses, 
12 
abnormal items and extraordinary items in order to capture 
the whole aspect of the liAs' amortisation accounting 
choices (see Section 3.2.1 later) . 
• The previous study uses the measure of total beQinning 
balance of liAs to calculate the independent variables, 
whereas the ,'~resent study uses the measure of liAs' 
average balance by dividing the total of liAs' opening 
balance and closing balence in the study year by two, in 
order to take into consideration of the impact of disposal 
or acquisition of liAs (see Section 3.2.1 later). 
In addition, the present study uses market capitalisation 
which was taken from Personal Investment as the measure of 
the denominator of independent variable in hypothesis H1a 
(IIAMC, that is the ratio of liAs to market capitalisation 
of companies) and as the measure of the independent 
variable in hypothesis H4 (SIZE) (see Section 3.2.2 
later). The previou3 study uses market value of equity 
l 
13 
which was taken from ~he Australian in hypothesis H1a and 
their own formula to calculate market capitalisation in 
hypothesis H4. 
Finally, the present study does not include the hypothesis 
of political sensitive industries which used by Coombes et 
al. (1993). It was not possible, with the time frame of 
this study, to seek the judgements of six individual 
academics to rate the industries. 
2.3.1 The Growth Option Nature of liAs 
Coombes et al. (1993, p.6) argue that the choice of 
amortisation rate is an "efficient revelation" of the 
growth option of liAs. The companies with valuable growth 
options on investments of liAs are less likely to choose a 
high amortisation rate as this would pass the wrong 
perception to the market about the investment value of the 
liAs in generating cash flows and thus the value of the 
company. 
This argument is made with the underlying assumption that 
the managerial performance is tied to the value of the 
company and thus the stock price movements (Coombes et 
al., 1993, p.&-7; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986, p.203). 
Consequently, the objectives of the management can be 
aligned with those of the company, so that the managers 
are more concerned with the real economic performance of 
the company and the cash flow effect of the IIAs' 
amortisation accounting choices. 
l4 
Further, the managers are less concerned with the profit-
based compensation incentives when the investments of liAs 
has a valuable growth option and thus more likely to 
choose the practice of lower amortisation rat& of IIAs. 
This research uses the profitability measure formula (rate 
of growth in operating profit) developed by Ayres (1986) 
to proxy the profit-based compensation plan. 
Therefore, it is suggested in this research: 
H18 : The higher the ratio of identifiable intangible 
assets to market capitalisation of companies, the lower 
the amortisation rate of identifiable intangible assets. 
H1b: The lower the rate of growth in operating profit of 
companies, the lower the amortisation rate of identifiable 
intangible assets. 
2.3.2 The effects of Legal Provisions Governing the 
Utilisation of IIAB 
Coombes et al. (1993, p.8) suggest that the different 
types of legal lives of IIAs will indicate the 
,, 
' 
l 
l 
l 
! 
! 
differential state of investment in the future, in which 
"lec;~al lives specify a maximum period over which the 
corporation ¥ill have exclusive right to the cash flows 
from investments in the assets." For instance, patents 
(16 years legal lives) have a higher amortisation rate 
than trademarks (no defined legal lives). Therefore, it 
is suggested in this research: 
15 
H2: Companies with identifiable intangible assets that 
have limited legal lives are more likely to have higher 
amortisation rate for identifiable intangible assets than 
companies with identifiable intangible assets th~t have no 
specified legal lives. 
2.3.3 Debt Contract Incentives 
Research in this area has concentrated on the details of 
covenant limitations to explain accounting chcice (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990, p.139). Consistent with Coombes et al. 
(1993), the two common covenants used in this research are 
leverage and interest coverage ratios, whereas leverage 
ratio is the maintenance covenants of the existing debt, 
interest coverage ratio is measured when further debt is 
to be issued. The usual argument is that management may 
use income increasing accounting methods (in the present 
study: the practice of lower amortisation rate of IIAs) 
to ease the covenant limitations under existing debt 
. 
• 
• 
• 
j 
~ 
' • I 
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contracts and to impro~e interest coverage ratio for debt 
.to be raised in the future. (Coombes et al., 1993, p.9-
11; Mhittred and Zimmer, 1986). Therefore, it is 
suggested in this research: 
H3a' The higher the ratio of debentures to total 
liabilities of companies, the lower the amortisation rate 
of identifiable intangible assets. 
H3b: The lower the interest coverage ratio of companies, 
the lower the amortisation rate of identifiable intangible 
assets. 
2.3.4 Political Costs 
Previous research (Coombes et al., 1993, p.ll; Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986) has argued that the reported profits of 
the companies that are more politically vulnerable, are 
more likely to be examined by the government agencies, 
trade unions and community groups who may have incentives 
to effect wealth distributions. Pirm size, which is a 
traditional political cost proxy (Matts & Zimmerman, 1990, 
p.139), is used as surrogate for political vulnerability. 
To reduce the political attention, larger companies tend 
to choose income decreasing accounting methods (in this 
study: the practice of higher amortisation rate of liAs). 
Therefore, it is suggested in this research: 
H4 : The larger the size of a company, the higher the 
amortisation rate of identifiable intangible assets. 
17 
Ho~ever, size is a noisy proxy for political cost because 
size may surrogate for other effects such as industry 
membership, competitive advantage, information production 
costs, and management ability and advice (B&ll & Foster, 
1982). Hence, the results of the size hypothesis must be 
carefully interpreted. 
CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Sample Selection 
18 
The initial sample of companies was selected from the 150 
largest listed Australian companies, ranked by market 
capitalisation published in June 1989 edition of Personal 
Investment. The reasons for this sample selection are, 
(1) to ensure that all the accounting practices identified j 
were adopted in periods considerably some time after the 
October 1987 stock or equity market crash; (2) any changes 
in the requirement to the IIAs' amortisation accounting 
policy choice as a result of voluntary compliance before 
or after the introduction of ED49 "Accounting for 
Identifiable Intangible Assets", which occurred in August 
1989, should be readily apparent; and (3) consistent with 
Coombes et al. (1993, p.12), the sample of 150 largest 
listed Australian companies was considered to be 
appropriate on the premise that they are the larger 
companies rather than smaller companies, and thus more 
likely to have engaged in takeover activity in the past 
and to have recorded IIAs as part of any business 
acquisition cost. 
Once the initial sample of companies was identified, the 
companies' consolidated annual reports, which were 
,, I .ii 
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available in either Australian Graduate School of 
Management (AGSM) annual report microfiche file or 
Australian stock Exchange annual report microfiche fil.e 
for the years 1989 or 1990, were examined. 
Table 1 
Sample Selection 
19 
1989 1990 
Initial sample of Top 150 companies based on 
market capitalisation in 1989 150 150 
Less: Companies without IIAs ;,n Balance Sheets (101) (100) 
Company for which it was unable to 
determine the amount ~mortised 
Companies that were reporting other than 
$A in annual reports 
Subsidiary company of another company 
in the same initial sample 
Companies for which it was unable to 
determine the market capitalisation 
Companies that were delisted 
Companies satisfied selection criteria 
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
0 
0 
45 
(1) 
(2) 
(1) 
(2) 
(5) 
39 
b shown in Table 1, 101 companies in 1989 and 100 
companies in 1990 were eliminated due to these companies 
having no IIAs recorded in the consolidated annual 
reports. For both financial years, several companies were 
l 
' ~ 
J 
l 
I 
I 
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excluded: 1 company for which it was not possible to 
determdne the liAs' amortisation amount, 2 companies were 
not using Australian currency in their consolidated annual 
reports and 1 company was the 65' subsidiary company of 
another company included in the same sam~le. This 
resulting in a sample of 45 companies that satisfied the 
selection criteria in the year 1989. 
For the year 1990, further elimination was done on: 2 
companies because it was impossible to determine the 
market capitalisation for these companies and 5 companies 
were delisted from Australian stock Exchange, leaving 39 
companies being included in the sample. 
The resulted sample companies are listed in Appendix A for 
the year 1989 and Appendix B for the year 1990. 
·, ,. 
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3.2 Variable Measurement and Data Collection Methods 
3.2 -~ Dependent Variable 
This research study is focusing on management's choice of 
liAs' amortisation accounting policy. Therefore, the 
dependent variable used in this study is the amortisation 
rate (AKORT), which will be correlated with the 
independent variable across the whole sample. AMORT is 
calculated as follows: 
AKORT = 
where, 
amortisation of IIAt 
II At 
amortisation of IIAt = (total liAs' amortisation expenses 
+ total abnormal ItA•s write-off 
items + total extraordinary liAs' 
write-off items) for the year t. 
The justification for usin9 this total measure of IIAs' 
amortisation is to consider the entire liAs' amortisation 
accountin9 policy by management, not only the normal 
amortisation .expenses of liAs. 
= avera9e baJ.ance of identifiable 
intan9ible assets at the end of 
year t which is calculated by: 
(Total IIAt +Total IIAt_1 )/2 
where, 
Total IIAt = total liAs at the 
end of year t 
Total IIAt-l = total liAs at the 
end of year t-1. 
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The justification for using this average measure of IIAt 
is to consider the impact of the disposal or acquisition 
of liAs. This measure tends to smooth out the extreme 
balance of total liAs when there is recognition of 
disposal or acquisition of liAs half way through the year 
t or the study year. 
3.2.2 Independent Variables 
Hypothesis H18 states that the higher the ratio of liAs to 
market capitalisation of companies (IIAHC), the lower the 
amortisation rate of liAs (AMORT). IIAMC is calculated as 
follows: 
IIAMC = 
where, 
!!At 
MCt 
!!At = as previ~usly defined in section 3.2.1 
MCt = market capitalisation at the end of year t which 
was taken from June 1989 (p.76) and June 1990 
(p.90) editions of Personal Investment. 
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Hypothesis Hlb states that the lower the rate of growth in 
operating profit of companies (OPGROW), the lower the 
amortisation rate of IIAs (AMORT). OPGRON is calculated 
as follows: 
OPGROII = 
where, 
PretaxOPt 
AMORTt 
PretaxOPt + AMORTt - PretaxOPt-l 
Pretax0Pt_1 
= operating profit before tax for the year t 
= the amortisation rate of liAs for the year 
t and this effect is realised by adding 
back to PretaxOPt 
Pretax0Pt_1 = operating profit before tax for the year 
t-1. 
Hypothesis H2 states that companies with liAs that have 
limited legal lives (LIFE) are more likely to have higher 
amortisation rate of IIAs (AMORT) than companies with IIAs 
that have unlimited legal lives. Consistent with Coombes 
et al. (1993, p.lS), the IIAs of each company were divided 
into two groups as either having a limited life or having-
an unlimited life. Those assets <;~rouped as havin9 a 
limited le<;~al life are: patents, property rights, 
copyri<;~hts, management rights, film and television 
production rights, television program ri;htzs, licences and 
franchise agreements; and those not havin9 legal lives 
are: business and brand names, trademarks, broadcasting 
licences (Australian companies always extend the le<;~al 
-~ 
; 
' 
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lives of broadcasting licences which are renewable every 
three years under the provisions of the Broadcasting Act 
1942), fermentation technology and mastheads. One of the 
problems in using this grouping method is that many 
companies group together the liAs of different classes 
which have d;,fferent legal lives, for example, patents, 
trademarks and.licences, and only disclose the total 
balance of the assets in the published consolidated annual 
reports. This problem is dealt with using the same coding 
as Coombes et al. (1993, p.lS), by assigning the value "1" 
to the company's group of liAs, if any of the company's 
liAs had a limited life and by assigning the value "0" if 
all of the company's liAs have unlimited lives. However, 
there may be a bias expectation involved in the finding of 
the H2 prediction, when using this grouping method, the 
companies which have liAs with unlimited lives (expected 
to have a lower amortisation rate of liAs) are treated the 
same as those liAs with unlimited lives (expected to have 
a higher amortisation rate of liAs). 
Hypothesis H3a states that the higher ratio of debentures 
to total liabilities of companies (DEB), the lower the 
amortisation rate of liAs (AMORT). DEB is calculated as 
follows: 
DEB = 
where, 
debenturet 
TLt 
debenturet = total debentures at the end of year t 
TLt = total liabilities at the end of year t. 
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Hypothesis H3b states that the lower the interest coverage 
ratio of companies ( INTCOV), the lower the amortisation 
rate of IIAs (AMORT). INTCOV is calculated as follows: 
INTCOV = 
where, 
PretaxOPt 
AMORTt 
PretaxOPt + AMORTt + Interestt 
Interestt 
= 
= 
operating profit before tax for the year t 
the amortisation rate of liAs as previously 
defined 
Interestt = total interest expenses (which excludes 
interest capitalisation) for the year t. 
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Hypothesis H4 states that the larger the size of a company 
(SIZE), the higher the amortisation rate of IIAs (AMORT). 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.4, firm size has commonly been 
used as a proxy for political costs (Watts & Zimmerman, 
1990, p.l39). There are a variety of measurements of. size 
such as total assets (Hagerman & Zmijewski, 1979), sales 
revenue (El-Gazzer, Lilien & Pastena, 1986), market 
capitalisation, and net income after tax and before 
extraordinary items (Wong, 1988). Initially, market 
capitalisation is used as the measure of size, the 
measures of total assets and sales revenue will be 
discussed for the sensitivity of the choice of the size 
measurement in Section 4.5.1. SIZE is measured as 
follows: 
SIZE = 
where, 
MCt = market capitalisation as previously defined. 
A summary of the calculation of each variable is presented 
in Appendix c. Section 4 will discuss tho results of the 
regression analyses of these dependent and independent 
variables. 
CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The classes of IIAs disclosed in the consolidated annual 
reports which were examined are summarised in Table 2. 
The classes and disclosure frequency of IIAs are 
comparable with that reported by Coombes et al. (1993, 
p.17) and previous studies (see Carnegie & Kallio, 1988, 
p.82; Goodwin & Harris, 1991, p.25; Wines & Ferguson, 
1993, p.98). Table 2 reveals that rights (of any type) 
are the IIAs that are most common and have the greatest 
disclosure frequency in the sample companies, whereas 
patents, trademarks and licences are the IIAs that have 
second greatest disclosure frequency. 
27 
Table 2 
Classes of liAs Involved 
Class 1989 
Rights (of any type) 14 
Patents/Trademarks/Licences 8 
Brandnames 5 
Radio and TV Licences 4 
Patents/Trademarks 3 
Management Agreements 3 
Patents 2 
Tradenames 2 
Trademarks 2 
Licences (of any type) 1 
Trademarks/Tradenames/Brandnames 1 
Technological Assets l 
Brandnames/Patents/Trademarks 1 
Trade/Business names 1 
Trademarks/Licences 1 
Patents/Licences/Technologies 1 
Brandnames/Trademarks/Licences 1 
Patents/Newspaper Mastheads 1 
Business names/Trademarks 1 
Newspaper Mastheads 1 
Trademarks/Brandnames 1 
Tradenames/Management Rights 1 
Trade & Brandnames 1 
Brandnames/Trademarks/Other 1 
Patents/Licences 0 
Franchises 0 
TOTAL1 58 
19% 
12 
7 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
49 
28 
Total 
26 
5 
0 
7 
6 
6 
5 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
107 
•several companies had recognised more than one class of 
IIAa. 
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:lll:!l!! ~ 
12C2!Y!tinsa f:ol icies 1• of llmml!l! ComJ!aniea 
1989 1990 
Policy n 
' 
n 
' 
1. amortisation 15 33.3 16 41.0 
2. no amortisation 19 42.2 17 43.6 
3. 1 & 2 5 11.1 3 7.7 
4. write-off ex.trao,;dinary 2 4.5 1 2.6 
5. write-off abnormal 2 4.5 2 5.1 
6. 1 & 3 1 2.2 0 0.0 
7 . 2 & 3 1 2.2 0 0.0 
TOTAL 45 100.0 39 100.0 
The accounting policies used by the sample companies in 
each of the financial years 1989 and 1990 are summarised 
in Table 3. This table follows a similar pattern to 
Coombes et al. (1993, p.18) and Wines & Ferguson (1993, 
p.100), except for the first category - amortisation, 
which is combinin9 systematic amortisation &;;,d non-
systematic amortisation, due to the reason that most of 
the sample companies' consolidated annual reports only 
reported the total balance of amortisation without 
disclosing the amortisation period of estimated useful 
life for each individual IIA. The accounting policies in 
Table 3 are: 
l 
l 
! 
I 
i 
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1. Identifiable Intangibles assets (IIAs) capitalised 
and amortised {amortisation). 
2. IIAs capitalised and not amortised (no amortisation). 
3. liAs capitalised with a mixture of amortisation and 
non-amortisation for different classes of liAs 
(1 & 2). 
4. liAs written off in a lump sums as an extraordinary 
item (write-off extraordinary). 
5. liAs written off in a lump sum as an abnormal item 
(write-off abnormal item). 
6. liAs capitalised and amortised and also a lump sum 
extraordinary write-off is made (1 & 3). 
7. liAs capitalised and not amortised and also a lump 
sum extraordinary write-off is made (2 & 3). 
Whereas in the year 1989, 19 (42.2\) of the 45 sample 
companies chose not to amortise any of their liAs, 5 
companies (11.1\) applied a dual policy in which some but 
not all of tbe liAs were amortised; in the year 1990, of 
the 39 sample companies, 17 (43.6\) chose the zero 
amortisation policy and 3 companies (7.7\) chose the dual 
policy. However, AARP would not accept no amortisation of 
IIAs because they view these assets as having finite lives 
(Coombes et al., 1993, p.3), and ED49 "Accounting for 
Identifiable Intangible Assets" was aiming to deter this 
practice of zero amortisation. The reasons ;iven by the 
sample companies in the consolidated annual reports for 
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not amortising some or all of their liAs are summarised in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 
Reaaons Given for Accounting PolicY on liAs 
Reasons for not amortising 
Infinite U~eful Economic Life 
and Regularly Revalued 
Regularly Revalued 
Limited Useful Life but likely 
to be Renewed 
No Diminution in Value and 
Regularly Revalued 
Infinite Useful Economic Life 
Indeterminable Useful Economdc 
Life ar~d Regularly Revalued 
No amortisation until Limitati~n 
n 
1989 
5 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
' 
19.2 
11.5 
11.5 
7.7 
3.9 
3.9 
or Loss of useful economic life 1 3.9 
38.4 No Reason/No policy 10 
TOTAL 
Reasons fDr amortising 
Finite Useful Economic Life 
Amount write-off to recognise 
permenent diminution 
Ho Reason/No Policy 
TO'rAL 
36a 100.0 
15 
2 
8 
60.0 
8.0 
32.0 
25a 100.0 
n 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
0 
9 
1990 
' 
13.6 
13.6 
13.6 
9.1 
4.6 
4.6 
o.o 
40.9 
22b 100.0 
13 
3 
5 
61.9 
14.3 
23.8 
2lb 100.0 
a, companiea in 1989 and b4 in 1990 with dual policies 
atated diffarent reasons for different classes of liAs. 
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Consistent with Coombes et al. (1993, p.19), the most 
common reasons for not amortising liAs were that the asset 
involved is either characterised to have an infinite 
useful economic life and subjected to regularly 
revaluation, or having a limited useful l.ife but the life 
is likely to be extended or renewed. On the other hand, 
the reasons given for amortising the liAs were that the 
asset is ~ither having a finite useful economic life (the 
most common reason), or recognising permanent diminution 
in value. From the results in Table 4, prima facie, the 
hypotheses H1a and a 2 are supported. 
The Systat (Version 5.1) statistical software package 
(Wilkinson, 1989) was used in this research to analyse and 
present the outcome of descriptive statistics, simple 
regression (univariate analysis) and multiple regression 
(multivariate analysis). 
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4.2 Econometric Problems 
Regression analyses for both the two-variable linear 
(simple) regression and multiple regression are used to 
test the hypotheses stated in Section 2.3. Whenever more 
than one independent variable appears in a regressiQn 
model, there are other issues which arise about the 
relationships between some or all of the variables. There 
are two fundamental assumptions that are critically 
important and relevant to the validity ~f the regression 
results in this study (Bails & Peppers, 1993, p.240, 254-
256; Draper & Smith, 1981): 
(1) No multicollinearity: the independent variables must 
be independent of each other. In other words, the problem 
of multicollinearity occurs when the independent variables 
contribute somewhat overlapping information for describing 
the dependent variable. 
(2) No heteroscedasticity: the assumption of the 
homoscedasticity that the variance of the error term is 
constant for all values of independent variables. That is 
heteroscedasticity occurs when the nonconstant error 
variance occurs. 
Econometric problems occur when these two assumptions are 
violated. In other words, when the problems of 
heteroscedasticity r.nd multicollinearity occur, the 
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validity of the regression results will be questionable. 
These econometric problems occurred in this study and have 
been dealt with by transformation of the var.!.ables (Draper 
& Smith, 1981) using statistical software package Systat 
Version 5.1 (Wilkinson, 1989). All the observations of 
dependent variable AMORT were increased by 0.0001 before 
receiving the natural log transformation due to a number 
of zero value observations. The independent variable 
IIAMC received the same transformation treatment. The 
independent variable DEB was redefined using a fourth root 
transformation. All the negative observations of the 
independent variable INTCOV were winsorized to the next 
extreme small positive value of 0.100 in 1989 and 0.555 in 
1990 before receiving the natural log transformation. The 
most extreme neqative observations of the independent 
variable OPGROW were winsorized to the next most extreme 
negative value: -72.007 to -3.002 in 1989 and -78.688 to 
-5.661 in 1990, then, all the observations received the 
exponential function transformation. All the observations 
of the independent variable SIZE received the natural log 
transformation. No transformation was made to the 
independent variable LIFE. 
The statistical procedures that are available in Systat 
version 5.1 to test for the existence of multicollinearity 
and heteroscedasticity will be discussed and shown in 
section 4. 4. 
Table 5 presents descriptive statistics of the raw data 
for dependent and independent variables in both 1989 and 
1990 across the sample companies. 
Table 5 
Descri2tive Statistics (Raw Datal 
Variables Mean Median std.Dev. Minimum Maximum 
(1989 n = 45) 
AMORT 0. 090 0.002 0.2l9 0.000 1.000 
DEB 0.004 0. 000 0.013 0.000 0.078 
INTCOV 9. 047 4. 051 24.851 -0.594 168.654 
OPGROW -1.459 0 .198 10.784 -72.007 1.628 
IIAMC 0.406 0. 037 1.046 0.000 5.331 
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SIZE 0 .16E10 0. 72E10 0.21E10 0 .12E9 0 .10Ell 
LIFE Number of Limited Life Companies (1) = 32 
Number of Unlimited Life Companies (0) = 13 
(1990 n = 39) 
AMORT 0.085 0.005 0.222 0.000 l.OOO 
DEB 0 .OQl 0.000 0.005 o.ooo 0.026 
INTCOV 68.116 4. 643 317.924 -1.378 1958.083 
OPGROW -1.845 0.025 12.747 -78.688 8.046 
IIAMC 0. 487 0.046 1.908 o.ooo 11.676 
SIZE 0 .18!10 0. 25!10 0.99!9 0. 82E8 0 .13Ell 
LIFE Number of Limited Life Companies (1) = 29 
Number of Unlimited Life Companies (0) = 10 
' 
-~ 
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Tablti 6 presents descriptive statistics for the 
transformed data. The transformation of data is discussed 
in Section 4 o 2 o 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics {Transformed Data) 
Variables Mean Median StdoDevo Skewness Kurtosis 
(1989 n = 45) 
lnl\MORT -5o891 -6 o136 3 0 382 Oo 271 -1.578 
DEBOo25 0 o068 0 oOOO 0 o140 1o859 2o182 
lniNTCOV 1.287 1.389 1o 298 -Oo452 2o442 
eOPGROW 1.412 1.219 0 0 985 2o124 5o487 
lniil\MC -3o371 -3 0 294 2 0 714 -Oo443 Oo001 
lnSIZE 20 0 500 20 0 395 1o159 Oo444 -0o946 
LIFE Number of Limited Life Companies (1) = 32 
Number of Unlimited Life Companies (0) = 13 
(1990 n = 39) 
lnl\MORT -5o7ll -s 0 201 3 0 332 0 0 095 -10 611 
DEBO o 25 Oo040 0 0 000 0 o104 2o381 4o194 
lniNTCOV 1.689 1o535 1.581 1.804 4o434 
eOPGROW 1.420 1.025 1ol42 1. 409 1.069 
lniiliMC -3o397 -3o077 2 0 429 -Oo173 0 0 538 
lnSIZE 20o642 20 0 716 1.217 Oo119 -Oo664 
LIP! Number of Limited Life Companies (1) = 29 
Humber of Unlimited Life Companies (0) = 10 
J 
' 
--~ 
i 
; 
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] 
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4.3 Univariate Analysis 
Table 7 presents, using Pearson product moment 
correlation, the correlation coefficients between the 
dependent variable (AMORT) and the set of independent 
variables. 
Table 7 
Pearson Correlations with InAMORT 
Correlation Coefficient 
(' p' • one-tailed) 
DEB0.25 lniNTCOV eOPGROll lniiAMC lnSIZE LIFE 
1989 (n = 45) 
0.249 0.108 0.138 -0.301 0.046 0.397 
(0.050) (0.240) (0.183) (0.022) (0.382) (0.004) 
1990 (n = 39) 
0.152 0.019 0.022 -0.316 0.043 0.388 
(0.178) (0.455) (0.447) (0.025) (0.397) (0.008) 
Consistent with Coombes eta!. (1993, p.21) across the two 
financial years 1989 and 1990, both the IIAMC (p<.05) and 
LIFE (p<.01) are si9nificantly correlated with AMORT, and 
the negative correlation for IIAMC and positive 
correlation for LIFE support hypotheses H1a and H2. 
Althou9h the independent variable DEB0.25 in 1989 (p=.050) 
is si9nificantly correlated with AMORT, the positive 
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correlation does not support hypothesis H3a· In 1990, 
DEB0.25 is no longer significant in the opposite predicted 
direction. The results on the remaining variables are not 
significant at conventional levels (at least .100) and 
thus do not support H1b• H38 , H3b and H4. Also, the 
results from Table 7 indicate that there is no difference 
in the Ill\.s' amortisation pol icy choice before or after 
the releaoe of ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable 
Intangible Assets". 
Soliman (1989, p.66) suggests that no independent variable 
per se is likely to explain the dependent variable when 
the preliminary examination of the sim~le correlation 
coefficients shows low correlation. It appears in this 
study that the highest correlation is consistently between 
the independent variable LIFE and the dependent variable 
AMORT, 0.397 in 1989 (R2 = 0.158) and 0.388 in 1990 
(R2 = 0.151). Therefore, it is expected that a 
combination of the set of independent variables when 
examined using multivariate analysis will provide better 
and a more powerful explanation of the accounting choices 
made by management. 
·• 
4.4 Multivariate Analysis 
The multivariate model used by this research is: 
lnAHORT = aO - B1lnllAMCi + B2eOPGROWi + B3LlFEi -
B4DEBi0.2S + BslnlNTCOVi + B6lnSlZEi + ei 
where, i = company 1 to company 45 in the year 1989 and 
company 1 to company 39 in the year 1990. 
Table 8 below presents the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression results on all the variables across 1989 and 
1990. 
In 1989, the estimated R2 is 0.345 and the F ratio 3.332 
is significant at the p=.010 level. The llAMC and LIFE 
variables are significant with the.expected sign at the 
p<.026 level (two-tailed). The OPGROW variable i~ 
significant (p<.083, one tailed) with the expected sign 
and the remaining variables are insignificant at 
39 
conventional levels (at least .100). In 1990, the 
estimated R2 is 0.278 and the F ratio 2.051 is significant 
at the p=.087 level. Consistent with the results in 1989, 
both the IIAHC and LIFE variables are significant at the 
p<.028 level (two-tailed) with the expected sign. The 
remaining variables including OPGROW are insignificant at 
the conventional levels. It appears from the results in 
Table 8 that the hypothesis H1b is the only hypothesis 
40 
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Table 8 
OL§ B!~U:esston Results 
Dependent Variable: lnAMORT 
variables Pred.Sign Coefficient t-stat 'p' (two-tailed) 
1989 (n = 45) 
Constant +/- -3.752 -0.461 0.647 
lniiAMC -o. 416 -2.323 0.026 
eOPGROW + 0.729 1.414 0.165 
LIFE + 3.251 3.113 0.004 
DEB0.25 4.419 1.265 0.214 
lniNTCOV + -0.003 -0.006 0.995 
lnSIZE + -0.350 -0.867 0.392 
!'-Ratio 3.332 (p=.010) 
estimated R2 0.345 
1990 (n = 39) 
Constant +/- -5.722 -o. 659 0.514 
lniiAMC -0.509 -2.307 0.028 
eOPGROW + 0.639 0.997 0.326 
[, II.'E + 2.875 2.459 0.020 
Dl!B0.25 2.932 0.573 0.571 
lniiiTCOV + -0.317 -0.697 0.491 
lnSIZE + -0.211 -o. 493 0.625 
!'-Ratio 2.051 (p=.087) 
estimated R2 0.278 
{ 
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that has inconsistent results between 1989-1990 which is 
supported in 1989, p=.083 (one-tailed) with expected sign 
and not in 1990. This is possibly because of the issue of 
the ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable Intangible Assets" 
<_ 
which occurred in August 1989. 
The remaining results are consistent with the univariate 
results which support hypotheses H1a and H2 and do not 
support hypotheses H3a, H3b and H4 . These results are 
also comparable with those in Coombes et al. (1993, p.22). 
Table 9 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the 
year 1989 between independent variables and extended 
results about the information of multicollinearity 
problem. According to Belsley, Kuh & Welsh (cited in 
Wilkinson, 1989, p.l63), "a condition index greater than 
15 indicates a possible problem and one greater than 30 
suggests a serious problem with collinearity." As shown 
in the table 9, no condition index is greater than 15 
except index 7 which is between constant and SIZE as 
indicated in variance proportions. Since the constant is 
only an intercept, it is not a problem in this case. 
Therefore, there is no problem with multicollinearity 
among the independent variables. A plot of residuals 
against predicted values is shown in Figure 1 which 
indicates little change in the residuals as the estimates 
(predicted values) increase, as the problem with 
heteroscedaaticity occurs when the non-constant variance 
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appears to be a large increasing or decreasing function of 
the estimates (Draper & Smith, 1981, p.237). Therefore, 
there is no problem with heteroscedasticity in the 
regression. 
Table 9 
Pearson Correlation Matrix (1989 n = 45l 
LIFE DEB0.25 lniNTCOV eOPGRON lniiAMC lnSIZE 
LIFE 1.000 
DEB0.25 
-0.259 1.000 
lniNTCOV -0.017 0.091 1.000 
eOPGRON 0.099 0.192 -0.354 1.000 
ln!IAMC -o .136 0.100 0. 261 0.076 1.000 
lnSIZE -0.135 -0.130 -0.016 0.035 0.220 1.000 
Extended Results: 
Condition Indices 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.000 2.287 3.502 4.009 4.635 6.291 58.885 
Variance Proportion 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.994 
LIFE 0.007 0.017 0.166 0.014 o. 235 0.553 0.008 
DEB0.25 0.007 0.483 0.285 0.072 0.138 0.000 0.015 
lniiiTCOV 0.010 0.052 0.224 0.428 0.257 0.030 o.ooo 
eOPGRON 0.007 0.025 0.001 0.024 0.566 0.371 0.005 
ln!UHC 0.010 0.004 0.149 0.626 0.047 0.127 0.037 
lnSIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 o.ooo 0.005 0.994 
43 
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Figure 1 - A Plot of Residuals Against Estimates 
(Predicted Values) for 1989 (n = 45) 
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Table 10 and fi9ure 2 present the results for the year 
1990 which are similar to those of Table 9 and Fi9ure 1. 
Table 10 
f:earson Correlatign Matrix {1990 n = 39} 
LIFE DEB0.25 lniHTCOV eOPGROW lniiAMC lnSIZE 
LIFE 1.000 
DEB0.25 
-0.225 1.000 
lniHTCOV -0.090 0.036 1.000 
eOPGROW 0.053 0.139 -0.702 1.000 
lniiAMC -0.025 -0.041 0.248 -0.290 1.000 
lnSIZE -0.051 -0.110 0.119 -0.126 0.286 1.000 
Extended Results: 
Condition Indices 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1.000 2. 243 3. 214 4. 201 5.410 7.171 55.738 
Variance Proportion 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Constant 0.000 o.ooo o.ooo 0.000 0.003 0.004 0.994 
LIFE 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.325 0.508 0.145 0.000 
DI!B0.25 0.005 0.576 0.284 0.110 0.011 0.004 0.010 
lniHTCOV 0.006 0.026 0.096 0.087 0.282 0.489 0.013 
eOPGROW 0.005 0.021 0.076 0.001 0.134 0.752 0.008 
lniiAMC 0.008 0.001 0.193 0.423 0.036 0.303 0.039 
lnSIZI! 0.000 0.000 o.ooo o.ooo 0.003 0.003 0.993 
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Figure 2 - A Plot of Residuals Against Estimates 
(Predicted Values) for 1990 (n = 39) 
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4.5 Specification Analysis 
4.5.1 Alternative IIAHC and SIZE measures 
In order to test the sensitivity of results r~ported in 
table 8, the measurements of the independent variable SIZE 
was calculated using sales revenue and total assets and 
the IJAMC variable was redefined using the following 
formulas: 
(1) IIAREV = 
where, 
II At 
REVt 
IlAt = liAs' average balance as previously defined in 
section 3.2.1 
RBVt = sales revenue at the end of year t. 
(2) IIATA = 
where, 
II At 
TAt 
IlAt = liAs' average balance as previously defined in 
section 3.2.1 
TAt = total assets at the end of year t. 
The results pattern of these tests are consistent with 
those in Table 8 and Coombes et al. (1993, p.25). In 
I 
~ 
l ~ 
I 
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1989, p values (two-tailed) are .029 for IIAREV, .042 for 
IIATA, • 249 for REV, • 355 for TA; and in 1990, p values 
(two tailed) are .033 for IIAREV, .054 for !lATA, • 751 for 
REV and .394 for TA. These results are presented in 
Appendix D and Appendix E, as well as Appendix C presents 
a summary of variables' formulas. 
4.5. 2 Pooled Data Analysis 
Table 11 presents a pooled data analysis which is 
combining data over 2 years 1989-1990. One of the 
underlying assumptions to use pooled data analysis is that 
Table 11 
OLS Tiegression Results (Pooled n = 841 
Dependent Variable lnAMORT 
Variables Pred.Siqn Coefficient t-Stat 'p' (two-tailed) 
Constant +/- -5.006 -0.887 0. 378 
lniiAMC -0.466 -3.588 0.001 
eOPGROW + 0.611 1.639 0.105 
LIFE + 3.063 4.118 0.000 
DEB0.25 3.593 1.310 0.194 
lniNTCOV + -0.162 -0.594 0.554 
lnSIZE + -o. 264 -0.945 0.348 
F-Ratio 5.659 (p<.OOO) 
estimated a2 o. 306 
the accounting policy choices are assessed independently 
from one year to the next (Coombes et al., 1993, p.25). 
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Table 11 indicates that both the IIAMC and LIFE variables 
are significant at p=.OOl, p=.OOO levels respectively with 
the expected sign. Whereas the OPGROW variable is 
significant at p=.OS3 (one-tailed) with the expected sign, 
the INTCOV variable is significant at p=.097 (one-tailed) 
with the negative sign. The remaining variables are 
insignificant at the conventional levels. Consequently, 
the results from Table 11 are consistent with the results 
of univariate and multivariate analyses for each 
individual year discussed in sections 4.3 and 4.4, with 
the exception of hypothesis H1b (OPGROW) which is 
supported at p=.053 (one-tailed) level, the results 
support hypotheses Hla and H2 and do not support H3 8 , H3b 
and H4. 
The estimated R2 0,306 and F ratio 5.659 (p=.OOO) of the 
pooled model are higher then those in Table 8, probably 
because of the sample size is larger in pooled data 
analysis and hence providinq better explanation of 
accountinq choices. 
CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 Conclusions and Sununary 
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This research replicates with modifications the previous 
study done by Coombes et al. (1993). This research 
investigates whether the management's choice of IIAs' 
amortisation method is related to growth option nature of 
IIAs and the effects of IIAs' legal lives of the company 
(hypotheses Hia and H2), profit-based managerial 
compensation incentives (H1b), company's indebtedness of 
existing debt contracts (H3a), company's ability to raise 
future debt in debt markets (H3b) or political 
vulnerability costs (H4). The findings for both the 
univariate and multivariate regression analyses in this 
research support hypotheses H1a and H2 in the study by 
Coombes et al. (1993), which indicate that management's 
choice of amortisation on IIAs depends on whether the 
investment of these assets has a valuable growth option in 
order to generate cash flows into the company. The 
findings do not support hypotheses H3a, H3b and H4, which 
reveal that the practice of IIAs' amortisation is not 
related to the reasons of reducing covenant limitations 
under debt contracts (H3a> and future debt raisings (H3b), 
and causing minimisation of political vulnerability (H4). 
This research also attempts to examine whether any changes 
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in the liAs' amortisation policy choice occurred before or 
after the issue of ED49 "Accounting for Identifiable 
Intangible Assets". It appears from the results that _the 
only hypothesis that is affected by the introduction of 
exposure draft is the profit-based managerial compensation 
incentives (Hlb) to amortise liAs. Support for H1b only 
occurred in 1989, possibly due to ED49 "Accounting for 
Identifiable Intangible Assets" issued by the AARF which 
required systematic amortisation of liAs. These findings 
are consistent with those of Coombes et al. (1993). 
5.2 The Limdtations of the Research 
The limitations of the present study are, first, the 
rletail disclosure of amortisation policy and 
classification of each individual identifiable intangible 
asset was inadequate, some companies even reported only 
the total balance of intangibles' amortisation which 
included both the goodwill and IlAs. Consequently, 
subjective judgement may inevitably be involved in the 
present study to calculate the amortisation amount of 
liAs. One company is excluded in the sample due to the 
fact that it was unable to determine the company's liAs' 
amortisation amount. This limitation also suggesls that 
there is a violation in the goodwill approved standard 
ASRB 1013 "Accounting for Goodwill" in the study period 
1989-1990 which requires the goodwill amortisation amount 
to be disclosed individually and separately (ASRB, 1988, 
ASRB 1013, clause .70). Surprisingly, some of the 
consolidated annual reports, which ignored the ASRB 1013 
amortisation disclosure requirements, did not have a 
qualified audit report attached. 
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Secondly, the study only concentrates on the top 150 
listed Australian companies in June 1989, the results may 
not be generaliseable to smaller companies. Further, due 
to the sample consisting only of the top 150 listed 
companies, the study cannot include industry 
classification analysis as an explanatory variable that 
the resulted sample may be biased towards certain 
industries. Consequently, some industries have only one 
or not even any industry membership in the resulted 
sample. Therefore, further research would require a 
larger sample in order to better equip the study's 
inferential ability and to include the industry 
classification analysis in the study. 
Finally, previous research in contracting theory (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1990, p.l44; Zmijewski & Hagerman, 1981) argues 
that companies may use a portfolio approach and not 
concentrate on a single accounting policy. Nevertheless, 
the controversial nature of liAs' accounting policy 
(Coombes et al., 1993, p.S) justifies the research into a 
single accounting policy. However, caution must be 
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exercised in interpreting the results of the research into 
a single accounting policy. 
5.3 The Implications of the Research 
One implication of this research is that the results 
provided by the research suggests that contracting theory 
explains in part management's choice of accounting policy 
for amortisation of liAs. 
The findings provided by the present research are 
consistent with the study by Coombes et al. (1993) which 
suggests that the companies choose alternative liAs' 
amortisation accounting choice to reveal the generation of 
cash flows from the investments in these assets. The 
findings further support the development of the framework 
of a contracting theory of liAs' amortisation accounting 
choice. 
The findings may have some implications for the 
policymakers should they revise the exposure draft on 
accounting for liAs in the future. The evidence suggests 
that the implementation of the IIAs approved standard with 
statutory backing to enforce compliance may force the 
companies that have considered liAs• amortisation policy 
as an important approach to reveal cash flows information 
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to shift to alternative approach (Coombes et al., 1993, 
p.31). 
Finally, further research in this area may be extended to 
overseas countries including developing and developed 
countries. Only then can we ascertain whether contracting 
theory in relation to liAs' amortisation accounting choice 
is transferable to other environments. Further, a larger 
sample would permit the inclusion of industry 
classification as an explanatory variable. Additional 
insight may be provided by the inclusion of other 
variables such as audit firm size. 
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APPENDIX A 
Sample Companies - 1989 
Adelaide Brighton Cement Hold!.ngs Ltd 
... delaide Steamship Co Ltd, The 
Amcor Ltd 
Arnotts Ltd 
Australian Gas Light Co Ltd, The 
Bell Group Ltd 
BHP Gold Mines Ltd 
Bond Corporation Holdings Ltd 
Bond Media Ltd 
Bora! Ltd 
Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd, The 
BTR Nylex Ltd 
Bunnings Ltd 
Burns, Philp & Co Ltd 
Coles Myer Ltd 
CRA Ltd 
CSR Ltd 
Elders IXL Ltd 
Email Ltd 
Goodman Fielder Hattie Ltd 
Hardie (James) Industries Ltd 
ICI Australia Ltd 
Industrial Equity Ltd 
Interwest Ltd 
Jennings Industries Ltd 
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Kern Corporation Ltd 
Lend Lease Corporation Ltd 
Hayne Nickless Ltd 
H.I.M. Holdings Ltd 
National Consolidated Ltd 
News Corporation Ltd 
North Broken Hill Peko Ltd 
Northern Star Holdings Ltd 
OPSM Industrie~ Ltd 
Pacific Dunlop Ltd 
Palme" Tube Mills Ltd 
Pancontinental Mining Ltd 
Placer Pacific Ltd 
QBE Insurance GrouP Ltd 
Queensland Cement Ltd 
Rothmans Holdings Ltd 
S.A, Brewing Holdings Ltd 
Sarich Technologies Trust 
southern Farmer Group Ltd 
westmex Ltd 
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APPEIIDIX B 
Sample Companies - 1990 
Adelaide Brighton Cement Holdings Ltd 
Arnotts Ltd 
BHP Gold Mines Ltd 
Bond Media Ltd 
Bora! Ltd 
Broken Hill Proprietary Co Ltd, The 
BTR Nylex Ltd 
Bundaberg Sugar Co Ltd 
Bunnings Ltd 
Burns, Philp & Co Ltd 
Coles Myer Ltd 
CRA Ltd 
CSR Ltd 
Elders IXL Ltd 
Email Ltd 
Goodman Fielder Wattie Ltd 
Hardie (James) Industries Ltd 
ICI Australia Ltd 
Jennin9s Group Ltd 
Kern Corporation Ltd 
Lend Lease Corporation Ltd 
Mayne Nickless Ltd 
Mitsubishi Motors Australia Ltd 
M.I.M. Holdings Ltd 
National Consolidated Ltd 
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News Co<po<ation Ltd 
North Broken Hill Peko Ltd 
OPSM Industries Ltd 
Palmer Tube Mills Ltd 
Pancontinental Mining Ltd 
Pioneer International Ltd 
Placer Pacific Ltd 
QBE Insurance Group Ltd 
Queensland Cement Ltd 
Rothmans Holdings Ltd 
S.A. Brewing Holdings Ltd 
Sarich Technologies Trust 
Soul Pattinson (Washington H.) & Co Ltd 
Tooth & Co Ltd 
--- ---~----
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APPENDIX C 
Variables Definition 
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AMORT = total amortisation write-offs of liAs/average 
bal:an.ce of liAs 
IIAMC = average balance of liAs/market capitalisation 
OPGROW199 9 = (1989 pretax operating profit + total 
amortisation write-offs of liAs - 1988 pretax 
operating profit)/1988 pretax operating 
profit 
OPGROW1990 = (1990 pretax operating profit + total 
amortisation write-offs of liAs - 1989 pretax 
operating profit)/1989 pretax operating 
profit 
LIFE = 1 if the company has any IIA with a limited 
INTCOV 
legal life, 0 otherwise 
= total debentures/total liabilities 
= (operating profit before tax, interest 
expenses, total amortisation write-offs of 
IIAs)/interest expenses 
SIZE =market capitalisation 
Specification analysis using sales revenue: 
IIAREV = average balance of liAs/sales revenue 
SIZE = sales revenue 
Specification analysis using total assets: 
IIATA = average balance of IIAs/total assets 
SIZE = total assets 
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APPENDIX D 
OLS Reqr~ssion Results 
(Revenue instead of Market Capitalisation) 
Dependent Variable: lnAMORT 
Variables Pred.Sign Coefficient t-Stat 'p' (two-tailed) 
1989 (n = 45) 
Constant +/- -2.050 -0.272 0.787 
lniiAREV -0.433 -2.270 0.029 
eOPGROW + 0.758 l. 431 0.161 
LIFE + 3.185 3.003 0.005 
DEB0.25 4.382 l. 212 0.233 
lniNTCOV + -0.021 -0.051 0. 960 
lnSIZE + -0.431 -1.171 0.249 
F-Ratio 3.253 (p=.011) 
estimated R2 0. 339 
1990 (n = 39) 
Constant +I- -7.925 -1.093 0.282 
lniiAREV -0.475 -2.231 0.033 
eOPGROW + 0.747 1.140 0.263 
LIFE + 2.794 2.392 0.023 
DEB0.25 2.924 0.569 0.573 
lniNTCOV + -0.234 -0.514 0. 611 
lnSIZE + -o .113 -0.320 0.751 
F-Ratio 2.053 (p=.087) 
estimated R2 0.278 
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APPENDIX E 
OLS Regression Results 
(Total Assets instead of Market Capitalisation) 
Dependent Variable: lnAMORT 
Variables Pred.Sign Coefficient t-Stat 'p'{two-tailed) 
1989 (n = 45) 
Constant +/- -2.509 -0.276 0.784 
ln!IATA -o. 416 -2 .101 0.042 
eOPGROW + 0. 777 1.457 0.153 
LIFE + 3.143 2.998 0.005 
DEB0.25 4. 477 1. 250 0.219 
lniNTCOV + -0.014 -0.033 0. 974 
lnSIZE + -o. 407 -0.936 0. 355. 
F-Ratio 3.134 (p=.014) 
estimated R2 0.331 
1990 (n = 39) 
Constant +I- -1.936 -o. 200 0.843 
lniiATA -0.466 -1. 998 0.054 
eOPGROW + 0.650 0. 992 0.329 
LIFE + 2.848 2. 358 0.025 
DEBO. 25 3.249 0. 632 0.532 
lniNTCOV + -0.300 -0.642 0.526 
lnSIZE + -0.391 -0.864 0. 394 
F-Ratio 1. 924 (p=.107) 
i 
a2 ~ estimated 0.265 
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